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‘Financial brooks and creeks’ and the ‘financial Katrina’
Keen observers of criminal and licit finances and markets may realise we are living
in a fascinating time. This fascination is not due to some sophisticated sinister
criminal plot, but to the hilarious proportions of financial events and threats. We can
look back at a time span of two decades of anti-money laundering and crime-money
fighting policy. During these 20 years the US propelled FATF has elaborated a dense
system of supervision, watching every little financial flow, brook and creek.
Unwilling financial fishermen and game keepers have been pressured into
compliance to protect the ‘integrity’ of the elaborate waterways by preventing
criminally polluted water from slipping into the financial mainstreams. Those
unwilling to go along were bullied into line by threatening them with enlistment on
the black list of ‘Non-cooperative countries and territories’. And while in the end an
international compliant workforce emerged, humming and droning the ‘financial
integrity hymn’, reporting diligently on all and sundry, an unprecedented ‘financial
Katrina hurricane’ gathered pace. This time the main players were not sinister drug
barons, but short-sighted, irresponsible bank managers, ranging from over-bonussed
CEOs to middle level managers. They proved to be more concerned about their
stock options than contributing to the integrity of the financial system by a sound
lending and mortgage policy. While a trough of credit low pressure was gradually
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building up, the FATF and their FIU cohorts were still busying with financial
transactions of 15.0001 euros or money transfers of 2.500 euros: watching the brooks
and creeks at the time when the clouds were binding which would ravage the
‘financial New Orleans’. The distorted proportions between the mini-FATF threats
and the ‘financial credit Katrina’ are fascinating indeed. And if not so grotesque,
they would be quite hilarious.
Of course, it would be inappropriate to raise the question “Where were the FATF
and their allied gatekeepers”. Their task is not to watch irresponsible bankers
providing sub-prime loans, but crime-money flows. This is a serious issue because
two decades ago it has been declared serious. How serious? No one knows, despite
recycled FATF assumptions [1] or politically acceptable, but methodologically
flawed research (See: [2, 3]). It would be more appropriate to raise the question:
“How could high-level financial policy makers in international bodies—expressing
their “grave concern”—get so one-sidedly focussed on a phenomenon of which the
threat potential has remained unproved?” The answer to this question will require a
critical historical research: the “Making of the FATF and its global acceptance”. This
would be a unique historical text book which goes beyond a short introduction to
this special. But building blocks for such a historical research are already present in
the form of non-mainstream papers, some of which are included in this special,
though not written for such a historical review.
Four building blocks
One historical building block may concern the confluence of roles and interests of
the different players in the field of money-laundering. That does not mean that roles
get fused such that they can no longer be discriminated. They become interconnected
and mutually dependent and in the end form an ‘anti-laundering complex’.
In the first paper, Antoinette Verhage describes this phenomenon. She discerns three
groups of players: the supervisors, seeing to the execution of the FATF ‘recom-
mendations’, the financial institutions and all other entities obliged to report unusual/
suspicious transactions and the commercial firms which sell ‘compliance services’.
The roles of these players can be characterised as follows. The FATF brandishes the
big sledgehammer of the ‘Big CrimeMoney’, the commercial compliance firms provide
the anvil—of course for a handsome fee—to the pressurised financial institutions to put
their head on. The petrified institutions have no option but complying with the expensive
anti-laundering regime. While duly humming the ‘financial integrity hymn’, they
appoint expensive compliance staff or buy pricy compliance services. Failing to do so
may lead to the sledge hammer coming down on their head: reprimands from the
supervisors and (threat of) loss of reputation and income (which may be just a
convenient assumption). Nevertheless, a PriceWaterhouseCoopers survey of 2007,
mentions that 12% of the interviewed companies thought money-laundering a high risk,
1 All numbers in this special are written according to the European Continental annotation: commas for
decimals and dots between thousands.
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while only 4% of them reported any own laundering experience. This contrasts with the
many fear images of ‘embedded experts’, pointing at the negative effects of the
laundered crime-money: the disruptive effects on the economy and the financial system.
The effects mentioned encompass: increase of inflation due to the influx of crime-money
(but despite all laundering, low in the Euro zone and otherwise determined by world
commodity prices); unstable interest and exchange rates (steady in the Euro zone);
infringement on fair competition (but main infringements come from licit corporations
engaged in illegal cartels).
Given this list of contra-indications, we appear to have little to fear from money-
launderers, at any rate in the Euro zone. But the obliged institutions will be to be the
last to point at this plausible assumption. Instead, they comply after some silent
grumbling and are glad to see that the sledgehammer remains hovering in the air.
This applies to the financial institutions as well as the internal compliance officers.
The latter feel themselves in the institutions between the supervisors’ hammer and
their money-making colleagues, a kind of local mini-anvil. This is not a theoretical
picture: based on their responses to a questionnaire Verhage introduces us to the
compliance officers within the banks: she gives them a face and a voice.
Naturally, they grumble about some technical aspects in their job, but in general
they are proud of their work: “Today, without compliance, a bank can no longer
function”. This is not because of all the real threat they succeed in fending off. As a
matter of fact, the real ‘threat frequency’ is low while the officers think that their
compliance tasks actually slow down the handling of financial transactions. No, they
are proud because they do detect suspicious transactions, giving them the feeling that
a proper and recognisable compliance enhances the radiation of trustworthiness. The
idea of a kind of ‘laundering green label’: “This is a feel-safe bank”. Self-delusion,
as we will see.
As is the case with so many tasks, institutions must decide whether compliance is
a real banking task or whether certain facets should be outsourced. For example,
training, development of electronic tools, consultancy etc. are aspects of the
compliance tasks which banks may be willing to outsource. Hence, a market of
compliance services and tools emerges in which the threat of crime-money is
converted into licit money. Is this not the iron-cast formula with a high degree of
self-perpetuation? Yes, one can observe it repeatedly in the history of the threat
industry. It consists of a threat image (Crime-Money), an executive entity (banks)
and commercial service providers (security firms of various special tasks). Of
course, such a trinity cannot emerge and survive alone: it needs a surrounding social
and political mainstream in which politicians, law enforcement agencies and
(embedded) researchers are willing to turn assumptions into ‘facts’.
Meanwhile the integrity hymn is turned into a war song with ‘war’, ‘fight’ and
‘combat’ being the highest frequency words. In this regard, Liliya Gelemerova’s
paper ‘On the front line against money-laundering’ is interesting. As in wars
intelligence is vital, she directs her attention to the financial intelligence units at the
frontline: the FIUs. Her review of the development of this intelligence function
shows that it was the US agency FinCen (established 1990) which took a clear lead
(as can be observed in the whole money-laundering portfolio). FIUs sprang up like
mushrooms in an increasing number of jurisdictions entering (or being herded) into
the FATF perimeter.
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Meanwhile a shift towards widening the US jurisdictional circle could be
observed: FinCen would also provide assistance to the Treasury in the international
fight against money-laundering. Looking at similar usurpation of international
powers in the War on Drugs more than half a century ago [4], this was not a
surprising extension. Another predictable shift was the broadening of the list of
predicate crimes and institutions obliged to report. The dimensions of the anti-money
laundering regime started to grow quickly. After 2001 terrorist financing was
included and at last the politically exposed persons (PEP) because of potential
corruption money.
The author observes that meanwhile for practical purposes the concept of money-
laundering was broadened so widely as to encompass all movements of unrecorded
monies related to the underground economy. This broad concept is not very precise
and does not contribute to a clear and efficient intelligence process. In addition, it
was recognised that working with a list of not very clear indicators and often trying
to over-comply with regulations without assessing the actual risks, led to an
unwieldy flow of suspicious transaction reports, of which an increasing portion
ended in a later-to-be-used box (later a freight container). Hence, the risk based
approach was adopted to reduce the flow of false positives. However, what means
‘risk of money-laundering’, given the fuzzy definition of laundering itself ? When
we add to this the implications of the somewhat half-baked requirements concerning
Politically Exposed Person, we have some idea of the ensuing confusion which is
bound to blunt the intelligence weapon.
Of course, organisations can learn from experience and reshape or sharpen their
tools. However, such a learning process cannot develop without feedback. At this
point one can observe internationally a systematic shortcoming between the agencies
receiving and handling suspicious transaction reports: the FIUs provide insufficient
feedback to the ‘financial gatekeepers’; the police irregularly feedback to the FIUs;
the Prosecution hardly gives feedback to the police and the Courts to no-one unless
the verdict is published in the newspaper. So, how do the players in the field learn
from wrong risk assessments? They only know that overlooking right laundering
risks may entail the real risk of becoming reprimanded by the supervisors. To avoid
that risk, the best the financial gatekeepers can do is to extend their conception of
risk and report again every money movement that looks a bit unusual. Consequently
the quality of the intelligence will not improve, the dimensions of the FIU frontline
will increase and the concept of risk will become another hollow buzzword.
From the previous section one can deduce that the financial service providers are
very much aware of their prime risks: reputation damage and the supervisors (rather
than the real laundering) which may detect non-compliance which again affects the
reputation. This is elaborated in the third article by Jackie Harvey and Siu Fung Lau.
They show that in the perception of banks proper compliance is perceived as a
prevention of reputation loss, rather than as something to enhance their status. This
may explain why the financial institutions are pretty silent about their anti-
laundering compliance measures in their annual reports: most disclose just the
minimum of information about regulatory issues and measures to counter
laundering. About the expenses of their compliance policies the financial sector
remains silent! There is certainly no public compliance advertisement to draw the
attention of the public to one’s ‘laundering green label’: “We are the Most
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Compliant” (and spend the most on checking you!). This falsifies the frequently
stated idea that compliance would be used as a competitive tool which may drive the
institutions into an enhancing ‘virtuous cycle of compliance’. (This contradicts the
perception of the compliance officers in Verhage’s paper: sadly they may just delude
themselves).
Why should the banks let themselves drive to such an enhancement? That would
only make sense if public awareness of the money-laundering issue would be high.
That is not the case. The analysis by Harvey and Lau demonstrates that there is no
correlation between (the low) money-laundering coverage in the UK press (as a
measure of public awareness) and the number of words devoted to it in the banks’
reports. Even fines imposed because of compliance failures did not stir the press, let
alone the public. Naturally, things would be different if the customers would lose
their savings because of laundering activities. But launderers do not steal money
from the banks; they bring money to the banks. Only managers (may) steal or put
their customers’ savings at risk and get away with a fat bonus.
For good reasons the authors conclude that there are no foundations for the threat
rhetoric in the policy papers and other articles. There is no unambiguous relationship
between compliance and reputation. There may even be an inverse one: trust in a
laundering bank. As long as Luxembourg or Liechtenstein succeeded in protecting
the tax fraud savings of thousands of Belgians and Germans, the reputation of these
banks was high. This public reputation was not undermined by a potential drug
baron among these normal secrecy loving customers, but by stealing employees,
selling the records of customers’ names to the Belgian and German Tax Services. In
earlier sections I mentioned the lack of evidence of threat to monetary stability,
inflation or fair competition. Add to this the authors’ observed lack of correlation
between reputation and compliance, another conventional argument in favour of a
strict and expensive regulatory policy evaporates.
Even in the real estate market, frequently rated as highly vulnerable to laundering
activities, there is no evidence of worrying inroads [5]. True, much crime money is
invested in property but business property (for example apartments for rent) has a
low frequency while other effects are difficult to measure. Crime-money owners are
certainly not in a position nor intended to wreak havoc in the real estate market,
which is rather victim of US under-regulation.
Despite this lack of systematic evidence—going beyond the recycled FATF
anecdotes or typologies—the anti-money laundering regime has been extended to all
commercials sectors in which people with suspicious money may place their dirty cash.
This applies to the real estate sector, and dealers with all sorts of valuables: cars, antiques
(no laundering with Picassos or Rembrandts!) and jewellery dealers. The last mentioned
sector, particularly concerning diamonds, is covered by the fourth author,Maarten van
Dijck. Of course, there are many anecdotes of criminals as well as terrorists possessing
diamonds, which represent an efficient value carrier, being light to carry while they do
not smell. But laundering crime-money by means of diamonds? This is a highly
specialised world of trust and specialist knowledge. With a little velvet sack full of
diamonds one cannot say: “Count your money”. An inexperienced launderer may end
up with a sack of glass. This uncertainty lowers the laundering risks.
Nevertheless, the world of diamonds being based on trust also lacks transparency
and devoted transparency champions like the FATF do not like such dusky economic
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niches. Consequently the diamond sector has been brought within the laundering
regulation orbit too. The phenomenon of ‘blood diamonds’ also helped in
convincing all relevant parties that regulations were necessary to prevent the
revenues of the irregular diamond trade falling into the hands of warring parties in
West-Africa. However, the Kimberly Certification Process mainly covers the mined
diamond which does not play a significant role in funding the local wars. It did not
prevent the smuggling of alluvial diamonds to neighbouring non-conflict countries
where they may get their ‘clean’ certificates nevertheless. One may call this ‘origin
laundering’. Also otherwise, the anti-laundering regime seems to be directed at
diamonds related cash transactions above € 15.000 in the Western countries where
most of the retail trade takes place, as well as the upper level trade.
Nevertheless, despite the lack of evidence that diamonds play a significant role in
criminal money management, as soon as the relevant recommendations had been
issued the diamond sector did not lose time to comply with the anti-laundering
regulations if only by way of lip service. Here also the concern for reputation may
have been the main driver. According to Van Dijck this has contributed to
transparency in the sector. Given this lofty objective, what is the evidence that on
top of that there is any added value in fighting money-laundering in the diamond
market or other high-value object markets? It is true, criminals like expensive shiny
things: in the Dutch confiscation database I found 333 hits for the search word
‘diamond’. But this frequency should be offset against time: this database runs from
1994 onwards. Hence a frequency of 333 does not look like an impressive threat.
Even if one adds all the other gems, watches (with diamonds), golden lighters
(Dupont), Swarovski crystal (buckets full!) and other bling-bling there is no threat.
Most of these bling-blingies were for dressing up mom or a girlfriend if they went
out shopping in expensive shopping malls. But we found no trace of laundering with
diamonds or other expensive glittering things [5].
Compulsive excessive regulatory disorder
Here I am back at the opening metaphor: the anti-laundering regime as a huge
financial all brooks-and-creeks encompassing supervision system. It is enormous,
but it certainly does not reflect an ‘intelligent design’. It lacks any feeling of its own
(small) proportion in the whole or a larger view on the risks within the whole
financial system, where the real dangers—stemming from ‘greeditalism’—appear to
be looming. This global investment in myopic nosing around in transactions without
any clear sign of ‘victory’ gives the whole anti-laundering regime such an out-of-
proportion appearance. I do not want to belittle the issue: money-laundering does
exist and there are sound reasons to suppress it in favour of financial transparency
and honesty. But I feel puzzled about this relentless anti-laundering chase without
much thought devoted to a cost-benefit analysis [6]. I am equally puzzled by the lack
of analytically reasoning statements and arguments to their logical conclusions. Take
the buzzword ‘risk’ and the encouragement to adopt a risk-based anti-laundering
policy. If the anti-laundering policy is to be based on the risk principle in individual
compliance cases, that principle must likewise be applied to whole economic sectors,
jurisdictions or to the broader laundering policy as such. That implies that policy
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implementations must be based on the answer to risk assessing questions such as:
“What is the likelihood of money-laundering in a particular economic sector and
how to relate this to a certain intensity of supervision.” Should we lower the
intensity if the risks prove to be low? Such a serious risk based approach, taking
account of proportionality, has clearly not been adopted thus far.
Given the discrepancy between proclaimed threats and financial reality this risk
perspective looks surprising against the background of strange contradictions. On the
one hand the FATF and policy makers continue to issue warnings of looming threats,
while on the other hand, the apparently unconquered laundering phenomenon2 still
hardly creates a wavelet in the financial system of the industrialised world. I would
welcome well-substantiated examples of national budgets or a Central Bank in the
G-7 countries, which has become under pressure because of laundering (excluding
the usual income tax fraud).3
It is telling that this question is not raised by the FATF or the authorities let alone
researched. That might evoke a debate, which has been lacking (or avoided) thus far.
This lack of debate is quite understandable, because there is no reason for policy
makers to engage themselves in any debate with outsiders: they debate among
themselves or with politicians being in the same law enforcement mood. Assuming
the unlikelihood that an open debate will unfold, I think it would be more fruitful to
consider a innovative behavioural research project on “The making of the anti-
money laundering regime” as mentioned in the first sections. Research questions
abound. Why were implausible figures accepted with so much gullibility? Why are
such rambling definitions taken for granted and applied? Why are policy makers
keen on severe legislations in jurisdictions and sectors hardly threatened by crime-
money (apart from the moral adage “crime must not pay”)? Perhaps we are
observing a special socio-political behavioural syndrome: a “Compulsive Excessive
Regulatory Disorder” (with an acronym—CERD—otherwise it is not taken
seriously).4 This is a serious research-appeal to social psychiatrists making us
understand the behavioural aspects of the anti-laundering drive.5
As remarked before: I hope the reader may value the contributions in this special
as valuable first building blocks. May he add his own.
2 As far as the UK drug market is concerned, the fight against drugs and money is not very successful,
given the declining prices over the last years as mentioned by [7] quoting SOCA’s figures.
3 Inversely, the credit crisis in the financial upperworld may seriously impact on laundering and
criminal savings: how much crime-money is evaporating and will induce to a criminal rush to ‘de-
launder’ crime-money?
4 “Regulatory autism” may also catch the meaning. This has also a counterpart: “compulsive de-regulatory
disorder”, which has been the basis of US foreign investment and financial policy [8] It is a plausible
hypothesis to consider this policy as the breeding ground of the present credit crisis.
5 An historical example is the US driven penal law drug policy. In the near future we can expect a
manifestation of the CERD-syndrome directed at tobacco consumption to be followed by fighting the
‘calorie threat’.
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